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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

David R. Daines, Trustee of
the VERNA R. DAINES TRUST,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Appellate Case No. 20100997-CA
vs.
LOGAN CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation, and John and Jane Does
One to Fifty,
Defendant/ Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant Utah Code §78A-3102 (3) j .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
First Issue: Were and are the appeal proceedings of the Board of
Adjustments ("Board") invalid and unconstitutional as a matter of law because
jurisdiction over appeals from nonconforming rights determinations of the
Director of Community Development (herein "Director") was vested in the
Hearing Examiner under the Administrative Enforcement Code ("AE Code")?
i
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1

Second Issue: Were the appeal proceedings of the Board in this case also
unconstitutional and invalid as a matter of law because the Board failed to adopt
the rules of procedure required by the 1997 ordinance that created the Board?
Third Issue: Are the continuing appeal proceedings of the Board also
unconstitutional and invalid as a matter of law because the rules of procedure
adopted at the de facto hearing in this case are invalid?
Fourth Issue: As a matter of law was the Trust denied equal protection as a
class-of-one and was the Trustee a victim of civil rights retaliation in the City
bringing the single-family code violation charge?
Fifth Issue: As a matter of law was the Director's denial of the Trust's
boarding-rooming triplex claim and finding the home was a single-family
residence, arbitrary and capricious?
Sixth Issue: Was due process denied as a matter of law by failure of the
violation charge to notify the Trust of its AE Code right to appeal to the Hearing
Examiner?
Seventh Issue: Is the AE Code provision requiring the Hearing Examiner
to continue defensive nonconforming rights claims on appeal pending Board
determination unconstitutional as a matter of law?
Eighth Issue: As a matter of law does the AE Code shift the burden of
proof from the owner to prove the legality of establishing a nonconforming right
to the City to establish the illegality of establishment by a preponderance of the
evidence?
2
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N i nth Issue: As a matter of law what are the consequences of the failure
of the Mayor to adopt the policies and rules of procedure required by the AE
Code?
Tenth Issue: As a matter of law did the premises search without consent or
a warrant violate due process because it violated the AE Code, and also the Fourth
Amendment?
Eleventh Issue: Was the 2010 landlord licensing ordinance
unconstitutional because of the ways it regulated multi-family nonconforming
property rights?
Twelfth Issue: As a matter of law did the City's 2006 single-family
"Neighborhood Improvement" policy amount to a deliberate indifference to
nonconforming multi-family property rights resulting in the City's liability for
damages under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Thirteenth Issue: Are important civil rights vindicated by this Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action and should attorneys for the Trust be awarded
attorneys fees on appeal as costs?
Issues Preserved in the Trial Court
The issues are Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenges to the constitutionality of
all the City's policies and practices in derogation of multi-family nonconforming
property rights as a class who's property is located in single-family zones as a
result of down-zoning amendments. The unconstitutionality of those City actions
was alleged in the operative civil rights complaint, R 327-346, and were briefed
3
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and argued in plaintiffs memorandums regarding motions and cross-motions for
summary judgment on all four of plaintiff s unconstitutionality claims: Plaintiffs
Memorandum etc., R 473-492; plaintiffs Memorandum in Response etc., R 560573; plaintiffs (2nd motion) Memorandum etc., R 596-605; plaintiffs Combined
Memorandum in Reply etc., R 720-732, and; Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's
Opposition etc., R 753-761.
The Eleventh Issue regarding the constitutionality of the landlord licensing
ordinance effective July 1, 2010 after the summary judgment pleadings were
complete is necessary to a proper decision in this case under Kaiserman Associates

v. Francis Town, 977 P. 2d 462 (Utah 1998)1116-17.
Standard of Review:
The issues on appeal are all constitutional issues that arise from summary
judgments against the Trust and in favor of the City:
"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact, we are free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions,"
reviewing them for correctness... "In doing so we view the [undisputed]
facts in a light most favorable to the party against which the motion was
granted". Anderson V. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701(Utah 2005) quoting

from Sandy City v. Salt Lake County 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).
"Issues, including . . . due process, are questions of law which we review
for correctness. " Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants Inc.
156 P.3d 782 (Utah 2007), quoting DA. V. State 37 P.3d 1166 \% (Utah
App2001).
The standard of review for equal protection is whether the classification of
those subject to the legislation is a reasonable one and bears a reasonable

4
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relationship to the achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. Mountain Fuel

Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America,
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law. Tab 8 p 1.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without the due
process of law. Tab 8 p 1.
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. Tab 8 p 1.
Utah Code §10-9a-701 provides in part:
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance,
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide:
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances:
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances...
(3) An appeal authority shall: (i) act in a quasi-judicial manner...
Utah Code §10-9a-705 provides:
(1) Each appeal authority shall conduct each appeal and variance request as
provided in local ordinance.
(2) Each appeal authority shall respect the due process rights of each of the
participants.

5
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The 2004 Logan City Administrative Enforcement Code (herein "AE Code"),
Land Development Code (herein "LDC") §17.60.010 et. seq. is incorporated by
this reference and is located in Addendum Tab 6 pages 1-12 (herein T 6 pp 1-12).
AE Code LDC §17.60.030 provides in part:
The provisions of this Title may be applied to all violations of the Logan
City Code or applicable state codes which occur within Logan City limits
and such territory outside Logan City limits over which the City has
jurisdiction or control by virtue of any constitutional provision or law. This
Title establishes an additional remedy that may be used by the City to
achieve compliance with applicable codes. T 6 p 1.
AE Code §17.60.100 G provides:
"Hearing Examiner" means a person appointed by the Mayor or his
designee to preside over the administrative enforcement hearings.
AE Code LDC §17.60.180 provides:
It is the purpose and intent of the Municipal Council that any responsible
person shall be afforded due process of law during the enforcement process.
Due process of law shall require adequate notice, an opportunity to request
and participate in any hearing, and an adequate explanation of the reasons
justifying any resulting action. The following procedures are intended to
establish a forum to resolve and correct violations of the Logan Municipal
Code and applicable state codes fairly, quickly, and efficiently while
providing due process.
The 1997 Logan City Ordinance 97-52 § 6, Logan Municipal Code ("LMC") §
2.54.010 et. seq. titled "Board of Adjustment Established" ( "1997 ordinance") is
incorporated by this reference and is Addendum Tab 5 pp 1-3.
LMC § 2.54.040 B of the 1997 ordinance provides:
B. The board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals of any order,
requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official.
T5p3.

6
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STATEMENT OFTHE CASE
The Trust's operative complaint's (1) first claim was that the
Board's denial of grandfathering was arbitrary, capricious and illegal; (2) second
claim was that the Board proceedings denied procedural due process; (3) third
claim was that the Director's decision denied substantive due process; and (4)
fourth claim that there was denial of equal protection in discriminatory
enforcement, and claims under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights, declaratory and
injunctive relief. R 327-346. The Trust filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the first claim (Board review). R 418-419. The City filed a crossmotion. R 519. There was oral argument. R 580. First District Judge Clint S.
Judkins denied the Trust's motion and granted the City's cross-motion in a Partial
Summary Judgment and Order. R 582-586, T 4 pp 5-8.
The Trust filed a second motion for partial summary judgment on the
second claim (Board denied procedural due process). R 594-595. The City filed a
cross-motion on the second claim and a motion for summary judgment on the third
claim (Director denied substantive due process) and the fourth claim
(discriminatory enforcement). R 651-653. The Trust filed a cross motion on the
third and fourth claims. R 675-677. There was oral argument R 777. Judge Judkins
denied all the Trust's motions and granted all the City's motions and entered a
Summary Judgment and Final Order dismissing all the Trust's claims. R 779-782
This appeal stems from that final order. 790-791, T 4 pp 5-8.

7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Following is a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented

for review. These are drawn primarily from the record of the Board of
Adjustments proceedings ("R

") and undisputed statements of fact in the

memorandums in support of the Trust's (1) first and (2) second motion for partial
summary judgment; and (3) cross motion for final summary judgment on the
remaining claims presented by the Trust. l
There are 46 numbered statements of fact hereafter that will be referred to
in the Summary and Argument as "F (#)". Abbreviations and defined terms used
below are often those used in the previous statements of fact and others will be
indicated by ("

"). 2

1

All of the facts in the three statements of fact were uncontested. Copies of the
paragraphs referred to herein are included in the Addendum to this Brief divided
into Tabs. As used in this Brief, "T 1 ^ " refers to one of the paragraphs of
enumerated facts contained in the first statement, "T 2 ^
" refers to one of the
paragraphs of enumerated facts in the second statement, and "T 3 ^
" refers to
one the paragraphs of enumerated facts in the third statement. References to
documents in T(abs) 4-10 refer to page numbers ( p ) in those numbered Tabs.
2
"AE Code" is the City's 2004 Administrative Enforcement Code.
"Hearing Examiner" is the quasi-judicial appeal authority under the AE Code.
"Director" is the City's Director of Community Development, Jay L. Nielson
"Mayor" means the City's mayor, Randy Watts
"Council" means the City's Council, its governing body
"Board" means the City's board of adjustment.
"City Attorney" means the appointed City Attorney, Kymber Housley
"Trust" means the plaintiff/appellant, the Verna R. Daines Trust.
"Trustee" means the Trustee of the Trust, David R. Daines
"Verna" means the Trustor of the Trust, Verna R. Daines
8
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2.

Before down-zoning to single-family in 1990, the Trust home was in

an R-3 multi-family zone under the City's 1985 LUO §17-2-5 T 8 pp 2-3.
Boarding-rooming houses with up to four living units and unlimited occupancy
were permitted in since the original 1950 zoning. 1985 LUO §17-2-7 (6) titled
"Boarding or Rooming House" provides:
A building other than a hotel, where lodging is permitted or meals are
served for compensation, that qualify as a one, two, three, or four family
dwelling. T 8 p 4.
3.

In March 2006 the City initiated single-family zoning enforcement

proceedings against the Trust's nonconforming student boarding/rooming triplex
( T 7 pp 1-2 ) surrounded by six nonconforming multi-family dwellings very near
Utah State University ("USU").
4.

Prior to the 1990 down-zoning, the Trust home had been Verna

Daines' rooming-boarding home triplex surrounded by 5 fourplexes and a duplex.
Of the 30 homes in the Trust Home block 21 or 77% of the homes were multifamily. In the extended four block area 63% of the 142 dwellings are multi-family.
The area was substantially multi-family for a long time before the original 1950
zoning and developed into overwhelming multi-family by 1990. T 7 pp 3-5, R
148 (5) pp 1-4. All the city residential zones under the original 1950 plan-zoning
were multi-family. This was the predominant character of this 1950 college town's
residential neighborhoods for many decades before the 1950 zoning. R 148 (8) p 4
et. seq.
(

9
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5.

In a 1997 Council meeting called to "address the issue of legally

existing nonconforming land uses and structures", a councilmember stated the
City policy recognizing the numerous legal nonconforming property rights status:
(Councilmember) Borg commented: " It is important to understand when
we rezoned the city we did not put anyone out of business.. .We realized we
were creating nonconforming uses all over the city. I thought we were
coming up with a vision of neighborhoods without rezoning. Part of my
philosophy was 'attrition will take care of some of those uses" T 10 p 24,
T 3 Tf40.
6.

In January 2006 when Mayor Watts took office he changed that

policy. All branches of the City concurred in the "shift in policy" ("New Policy")
on November 7, 2006. The statements of the New Policy's derogation of legal
multi-family nonconforming rights is woven through the undisputed newspaper
account (T 3 TJ38, T 10 pp 1-2), the joint Council minutes (T 10 pp 3-6), and
summarized by a quote from Mayor Watts in 2009 that there was "a policy
decision that we will remove rentals from some neighborhoods in Logan". T 10 p
15. Major elements in the New Policy are; (1) legal nonconforming rights are
violations of zoning laws; (2) the assumption (false) that the neighborhoods were
previously of single-family character; (3) that City policy can lure single families
into the neighborhoods by terminating legal nonconforming rights, and; (4)
nonconforming rights are subject to City regulation like parking violations on city
street property and nuisance abatement.
7.

On November 20, 2002 the Council adopted AE Code LDC

§17.60.010-490 titled the "Administrative Enforcement Code" put in force

10
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September 2004 (herein "AE Code"). T 6 pp 1-12. The "Scope" clause of the AE
Code, LDC §17.60.030 states: "The provisions of this Title may be applied to all
violations of the Logan City Code or applicable state codes which occur within
Logan City limits...". T 6 p 1.
8.

Grandfathered nonconforming rights are occupancy numbers issues.

In the meeting adopting the AE Code the Assistant City Attorney declared its
source and purpose as follows:
Attorney Housley presented background on the ordinance... Work had
begun on the draft document one year ago, patterned after the Provo City's
ordinance. Attorney Housley pointed out the enforcement was not limited
to occupancy issues. It covered all City ordinances and State laws. He
stressed that the proposed Code did not give the City any authority it did
not already have.. .This Code, he said, would not take away a citizen's
grandfathered property rights. He said there were checks and balances
provided to help prevent abuse.
.. .ACTION: Motion by Councilmember Pyfer to change the ordinance
scope to address occupancy violations only. Motion died for lack of a
second.
Motion by Councilmember Borg, seconded by Councilmember
Allred to adopt Ord. 02-76, Administrative Enforcement Code. Motion
carried 3-2... T 10 p 25.
9.

In the May 4, 2004 meeting (then Assistant) City Attorney, Kymber
i

Housley reported the following to the Council:
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT CODE REVIEW. Assistant City
Attorney Kymber Housley briefly reviewed a code that was put into effect
about nine months ago. The Administrative Enforcement Code
decriminalized code enforcement, requiring a lower burden of proof similar
to Small Claims Court. Attorney Housley reviewed the hearing process and
said that Paul Larsen was the current Hearing Examiner. He encouraged the
Council to read the code. He said it was primarily adopted to enforce land
use violations and that area had been the focus, but other types of violations
could be addressed as well... T 10 p 26.

(

i

11
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10.

AE Code LDC §17.60.140 provides:

The Mayor shall establish policies and procedures for the holding of
administrative enforcement hearings, the appointment of hearing examiners
and the use of the administrative procedures herein by enforcement
officials.
11. The Mayor has not established or adopted the policies and procedures
required by AE Code LDC §17.60.290. T 9 pp 5-6.
12. Before initiating single-family enforcement against the Trust, the City
proposed by letter that the Trust gift a strip of its street frontage to the City for a
street improvement. The letter included a proposed gift agreement and plans for
the alternative to lower the street (Boulevard) eight feet with retaining walls and
railings which the City had no intention of doing. The Trustee did not respond
until the City by letter offered "a fair price". The Trustee responded by offering to
negotiate compensation, stating he had not responded to the earlier letter because
it appeared to be an attempt to extort a gift. Appraisals and negotiations followed
but did not result in an agreement. That portion of the much larger street
improvement has never been completed. T 3 ^ 4-10. The City initiated singlefamily enforcement against the Trust after it ceased negotiations. The City never
sought single-family enforcement against the Trust's multi-family street front
neighbors who received the same gift "request" letter but did not raise the issue of
attempted gift extortion. The north neighbor was a triplex. The south neighbor was
a fourplex. Tab 3 Tfl5. The Trustee at that time was the plaintiffs' attorney in a
zoning related civil rights action against the City in which the City prevailed in
12
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this Court. That case was addressed in the pleadings in this case. To I man V. Logan
C/tylOOl 167 P. 3d 489 (Utah App. 2007).
13. Enforcement started with a single-family "Compliance Request
Letter" dated March 29, 2006 requiring that the triplex use be reduced to singlefamily use unless a grandfathering application was filed by May 3, 2006 to avoid
the possibility of further enforcement and fines. The letter stated that a
"complaint" had been received concerning the property and a site inspection was
conducted on March 22, 2006 by City inspectors (T 3ffl[20-24)confirming that
there were three occupied apartments. AE Code LDC §17.60.150 provides in part:
.. .If a property owner or responsible person refuses to allow an
enforcement official to enter property, the enforcement official shall obtain
a search warrant before entering the property. T 6 p 3
14. The Compliance Letter was signed by James G. Geier, Neighborhood
Improvement Coordinator ("Geier") R 14-16 There was no reference to any
policies and procedures that were being followed in the code enforcement process.
The 2004 AE Code LDC §17.60.140 provides:
The Mayor shall establish policies and procedures for holding
administrative enforcement hearings, the appointment of hearing
examiners, and the use of administrative procedures herein by enforcement
officials. T 6 p 3

<

15. In response to the Trustee's GRAMA request in February 2011 the
I

City admitted that the Mayor had not established the AE Code required policies
and procedures. T 9 pp 5-6.

13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16. The grounds given for enforcement (R 17) was information sent and emailed from one named City employee to other named City employees stating
there was proof the home was being used as a triplex. T 3 ^fl[ 19-20, R 17-18.
17. On December 21, 2004 the Director "verified that all enforcement was
through complaints received from "citizens", based "upon complaints received by
staff from citizens" and that "a majority of complaints were resolved with a visit
and notice of warning in a non-confrontational way". T3^|12, T 10 p 21. This
policy was repeated on January 4, 2005 in the Council minutes (T 3 ^fl3, T 10 p
22); continued during Mayor Watts administration as confirmed November 7,
2006 (T 10 p 1); reconfirmed March 28, 2007 (T 10 p 11), and January 20, 2008,
confirming that the only exception to the policy was enforcing sign violations. T
lOp 15.
18.

The Compliance Request Letter was notice of a code violation and a

grandfathering application was the only remedy stated in the notice. R 14-15.
19.

The AE Code, LDC §17.60.300 provides that within 10 days of

service of a notice of violation appeal can be made for a hearing. AE Code LDC
§17.60.290 provides: "A. The notice of violation shall include... 7... and (notice
of) any other legal remedies." T 6 p 8.
20.

The AE Code, LDC §17.60.220 F provides:

A hearing examiner shall not make determinations as to the existence of
nonconforming rights. If a responsible person claims a nonconforming right
as a defense, the hearing examiner shall continue the administrative
enforcement hearing and shall refer the matter to the Logan City Board of
Adjustment for a determination as to the existence of a nonconforming
14
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right. The Board of Adjustment's decision shall be binding on hearing
examiner. The responsible person shall bear the costs of the appeal to the
Board of Adjustment. T 6 p 5.
21. On April 25, 2006 the Trust filed a grandfathering application with the
Director for a fourplex with the required supporting statement of the Trustee with
attachments supporting the claim. The Trustee stated he helped build the family
home with a basement apartment in 1952; that before her death in 1989, Verna
Daines divided it into a fourplex. After investigation and discovery it was
amended to claim a boarding-rooming triplex under the 1985 ordinance T 3 ^ 2 5 26. Geier's June 6 City inspection report stated the original home was a duplex
family home with a basement apartment (T 3 ^27) and the additional unit(s) had
been created through "merely shutting doors" between different portions of the
home. T 1 ^39. On July 27 the Director made a preliminary ruling that the home
could not be grandfathered disregarding Geier's report and invited added proof
including affidavits for his consideration before a final ruling. T 3 ^f ^f 28-29
22. On August 11th the Trustee filed fifteen (15) family personal
knowledge affidavits with exhibits and other proof supporting the Trust's claim to
a nonconforming boarding-rooming triplex with unlimited occupancy permitted by
the 1985 land use ordinance. They included proof that it was constructed in 1952
as a duplex with a basement apartment. T 3 Tf30. The affidavits were from nine of
Verna's eleven children, three from daughters-in-law and three from
grandchildren. T 1133, T 3 f30
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23. The affidavits established that; (1) the home was built in 1952 and
used as a duplex family home with a basement apartment rental; (2) after Verna's
husband died in 1959 she operated it as a duplex student boarding-rooming home;
(3) in 1975 Verna (and family) was honored by USU partly in recognition of her
rooming-boarding needy students in her spacious home; (4) Verna continued this
use until her death in 1989 and the Trust continued it thereafter; (5) before her
death, by locking two doors, she divided her duplex boarding-rooming home into a
de facto fourplex boarding-rooming home which only qualified under the 1985
(versus 1950) ordinance as a triplex., and; (6) the Trust continued this and the
boarding-rooming use. T 1ffiJ34-38,T

3

Ifi!31"34-

24. The Director made his final decision denying grandfathering by letter
dated September 22, 2006, with no reference to or findings regarding the Trust's
15 affidavits and other evidence and no explanation for the basis for the decision.
Based on the information provided as well as research conducted by
staff of City and County records, it has been determined that the property at
545 Boulevard, TIN 06-059-0026, cannot be considered a legally existing
nonconforming four-plex or triplex. In order for the property to be
"grandfathered" as multiple units, the information must show that the use of
the property as multiple units was legally established and has been
continuously occupied.
According to Land Development Code §17.59.040, T 8 p 6, the
burden of proof establishing that a nonconformity lawfully exists rests with
the owner, not the City. Types of information that are considered credible
proof are building permits, signed affidavits from previous tenants, owners,
and neighbors of the property, rental receipts, and lease agreements.
If you are not satisfied with the above decision Chapter 17.57 of the
Land Development Code allows you 15 days from the date of this letter to
appeal this decision to the Board of Adjustments. If you have any questions
feel free to call the Neighborhood Improvement Coordinator James Geier at
435-716-9027.
16
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Sincerely, s/ Jay L. Nielson, AICP Director of Community Development
T3 1f35,T9p4.
25.

In the November 14, 2006 hearing the Director's spokesman, Tavis

Austin stated the following regarding the Decision:
Mr. Croshaw(Board Chairman) ... hear an appeal of staff decision.. .to
deny the grandfathering request.. .Tavis (Austin) would you review the
findings on that.
Mr. Austin.. .again this is an appeal of staffs decision to deny a
grandfathering request.. .proponents family have modified that to a tri-plex
or an option to include a boarding house. In any instance staff was unable
to find proof of legal establishment or continuous occupancy as four or
three units or a boarding house as applicable definitions apply to the cities
time frame.. .it has ample parking. So this is quite a bit different from
previous ones.. .One of the main issues with this property is there were
never any permits...
Additionally is the continuous occupancy built in 1952 building
permit records as we are well aware are sort of hit and miss prior to 1963,
maybe it was built as four units. I can't prove it wasn't, have to give him
the benefit of the doubt.
Verna Daines lives there by herself for quite a long time by herself
as a single family unit. So based on the information that we have available
it has been occupied as a single family home for quit (sic) some time. So
because there is the lack of legal establishment and lack of continuous
occupancy staff denied the grandfathering request.. .That was a brief
history...
Mr. Mortensen (Board) I have a question regarding...
Mr. Austin:...1990 in this case is irrelevant in staffs opinion because
there has never been a permit to change from a single family home.
Mr. Mortensen...?
Mr. Austin.. .up until 1975 there is only one name in the polk, the
polk has flaws, the polk isn't a golden arrow but between 1949 and 73 the
odds of hitting someone other than a single resident increase dramatically.
And then from that time on, 77 to approximately 1996 there is evidence of
a basement apartment. Then in 200(sic) 2001 there is only one name,
maybe it's a flaw, what have you but the fact remains, we were unable to
find anything to change that changed the use of the home from a single
family home. R 150 (1) pp 1-3.
Mr. DSines: In brief these concerns are related to the failure of the
staff to consider in their investigation and denial the fifteen personal
knowledge ap(inaudible) form affidavits that were submitted to them to
17
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rebut everything that he said about the property. If you look at the staff
report it even indicates that they didn't even read those affidavits. I think
they said we submitted some kind of proof. R 150 (1) p 7.
Mr. Croshaw(board Chair) One other question Tavis while you are
talking. Do we have a copy of those affidavits and letters that Mr. Daines
was referring to?
Mr. Austin. Sure do. I can hand each of you (5) one of them if you
like, they are effectively the same affidavit with a different name in them. If
that is a point of contention I can hand them all out or make a copy for each
of you on all of them. R 150 (a) p 15.
26.

The facts explaining the differences and similarities between the 15

affidavits and attachments are detailed at T 1 ^34-38.
27.

The last paragraph of the Director's September 22, 2006 denial letter

regarding appeal provides:
If you are not satisfied with the above decision Chapter 17.57 of the
Land Development Code allows you 15 days from the date of this letter to
appeal this decision to the Board of Adjustments. .T 9 p 4.
28.

The Trustee in a GRAMA request for the appeal procedural rules of

the Board discovered LMC § 2.54.010-050 (1997), titled "Board of Adjustment
Established" ( "1997 Ordinance") which provides in part as follows:
020 MEMBERS 020 A. The board of adjustment shall consist of five (5)
members.. .4. The Director of community development shall be the
executive secretary and staff to the board of adjustment.. .030:
ORGANIZATION; PROCEDURES; A. The board of adjustment shall
establish its rules and bylaws in conformance with the requirements of any
ordinance or regulation enacted by the municipal council.. .2.The board of
adjustment shall adopt bylaws for its procedures and operations and shall
ensure that the bylaws comply with any ordinance adopted by the
council.. .040: Powers and Duties.. .A. The board of adjustment shall hear
and decide variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. B. The Board
of Adjustment shall hear and decide appeals of any order, requirement,
decision or determination made by an administrative official. T 5 pp 1-3.
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29.

The Trustee then made a GRAMA request for the rules and bylaws

for the Board's procedures and operations required by the ordinance. The City
responded that the Board had not adopted the ordinance required rules and bylaws.
T2^16
30.

Utah Code § 10-9a-701 provides that land use appeal authorities hear

and decide appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances and act in a
quasi-judicial manner. Utah Code §10-9a-705 provides that the appeal authorities
respect the due process rights of each of the participants.
31.

The Trust filed the appeal on Friday October 6, 2006 that included:

(first line on caption) CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY (R 79)...4... The
Trust hereby alleges that this de-facto Board is ultra vires and lacks the
power and authority to hear this appeal because it has never adopted the
rules and by-laws that would provide for the required due process to the
Trust...R 80.
32. The de facto Board proceeded with the appeal pursuant to LDC
Chapter 17.57 as stated in the denial letter, it set November 14, 2006 for the
hearing date and used four Planning Commission appeal forms for appeals from
development related actions of the City under LDC Chapter 17.57, as filing,
notice, staff report and agenda forms. R 83-86, T 5 pi 2
33.

At the November 14, 2006 Board meeting before the appeal hearing

started the following statements were made:
Board of Adjustments-November 14, 2006...David Daines Appeal
Mr. Croshaw (chair) .. .to begin with we have a couple items of business we
need to follow up on from our October 10th meeting. One would be to
review and adopt the by-laws as printed in our packet of materials. Kymber
19
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(Housley-City Attorney) do you want us to read these out loud and discuss
them?
Mr. Housley: Not unless you feel a need to? The lack of by-laws
were pointed out by the (inaudible) today although the remedy would be. In
the unlikely event that a court would uphold the lack of by-laws (inaudible)
all it would do is eliminate an administrative remedy once we have
exhausted the staff level. But since technically we are required to have them
then that technically will be one less thing I will have to deal with at the
court.
Mr. Croshaw: Has everyone had a chance to review the by laws and
are there any questions or comments?
Mr. Mortenson (Board member): I don't have any questions. I read
the by-laws and I thought they were straight forward and seem acceptable
based on our past practice. With that I would make a motion to approve
those by-laws. R 150(1) p 1.
34. The adopted "City of Logan Board of Adjustment Bylaws and
Procedures" provide:
... I. ORGANIZATION. C. Duties of the Chair...*. Move the
agenda along, hold down redundancy by limiting time allowed for
comments if necessary, set guidelines for public input, and reference
handouts and procedures during meetings.. .F.Secretary. A planning
division secretary shall serve as secretary of the Board. G. Duties Of the
Secretary I...2...3.. A...5...6..T 5 p 4-5
...H. Rules Of Procedure. The Board shall use a modified Roberts
Rules of Order in conducting board meetings. T 5 pp 4-5.
35. At the hearing the City Attorney responded to the Trustee's claims to
lack of Board authority and denial of due process:
Mr Housley: I am just going to address the procedural issues that were
raised and I will start from the very beginning. First of all Mr. Daines
claims that he had no idea this was a quasi-judicial proceeding. Really any
appeal of a land use issue goes without saying that if it's not legislative it's
going to be quasi-judicial. But simply referring to Utah code which gives
this board authority to exist, the code states that the appeal authority shall
act in a quasi-judicial manner. So it should come as no surprise, especially
a law trained individual like Mr. Daines that this was a quasi-judicial
proceeding. As far as the due process goes he refers to the lack thereof.
Admittedly we did not have by-laws passed but that is not where the due
20 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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process rights are contained...Ordinance and that is contained in Chapter
17 or Title 17 Chapter 57 of our Land Use Code and just a review of that,
addressing all the issues that he referred to it talks about.. .time limit to
filing the appeal. It describes contents of the appeal.. .Goes through the
public notice, the staff report, as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 55 it
requires all staff reports be given three days before the public meeting and
then at the meeting it explains that the proponent shall have an opportunity
to speak, that the staff report will be there, that any testimony that they wish
to offer will be.. .and that the board has the discretion from
there.. .information they want. The decision of the appeal Board .. .clearly
states that this Board has the right to make a decision by upholding,
modifying, or denying, or continuing the meeting for further information.
So again I think all of the procedural issues that Mr. Daines complained of
are contained its just they are adopted by ordinances and apparently he
never did receive this chapter? But its just like everything else, our city
codes are available to all and he never specifically requested it apparently...
R 150 (l)pp 11-12.
36.

The 2004 AE Code LDC Title 17 Chapter 60, AE Code LDC

§17.60.010-230 drafted by City Attorney Housley provides detailed due process
rights including: subpoena power for witnesses, documents and other evidence;
informal discovery, rules of procedure; burden of proof rules; right to cross
examine witnesses, and, present evidence including affidavits and testimony by
telephone or electronically. T 6 pp 1-6.
37.

Title 17 Chapter 57 of the Land Use Code City Attorney Housely

claimed to the lay Board was the due process ordinance begins with LDC
§17.57.010: "The purpose of this Chapter is to provide uniform appeals
procedures for development related actions of the City." T 5 p 6
38. The November 14, 2006 hearing was continued and ended on January
2, 2007. The Trust entered more affidavits and proof in the record. The Board
decided the home was a two family home and denied the Trust claim that it was a
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

boarding-rooming triplex with unlimited occupancy. Except for the Trust's proof
the proceedings were legislative un-sworn discussions with no cross-examination
following Robert's Rules of Order. The Board considered policy factors including
adequacy of parking, restricting occupancy, consistency with City and Board
policies and precedents, returning the neighborhood to single-family and safety in
denying the Trust claim. The Director who's decision was the subject of the appeal
was the Board's Executive Secretary and staff. R 150 (l)-(2). The last day the
City Attorney stated he was representing the Board not the Director's staff, and the
Director's staff spokesman represented the Director stating that the City Attorney
could not respond for the Director. R 150 (2) pp 15-16.
39.

The de facto Board proceeding under Robert's Rules of Order

continues hearing appeals from the Director's nonconforming rights decisions. See
T 10 pp 10 (2007), 14 (2008), and 18 (2010) where a Council member made the
following statement regarding the grandfathering requirements in the landlord
licensing ordinance.
Councilmember Daines said as part of the grandfathering process there is a
specific citizens committee called Logan City's Board of Adjustment,
which is a citizens committee and they do hear appeals...
40.

In the citywide policy terminating legal nonconforming rights

declared on November 7, 2006, one of the means considered for implementing the
termination policy was the adoption of a Provo type ordinance requiring that
landlords obtain business licenses, reported to be a "rousing success". T 10 pp 1-2
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41.

After the summary judgment pleadings were complete the Council

adopted an ordinance titled LMC "Chapter 5.17. Regulatory Business Licensing of
Landlords of Rental Dwellings", LMC §5.17.010-120, effective July 1, 2010
herein the "Lie. Ordinance". T 9 pp 1-3. It's stated purpose "A" is "to promote
public health safety and welfare by requiring rental dwellings to be safe and fit for
human habitation", and "B", "to insure that all rental dwellings were established
legally and constructed compliant with the building code at the time of
establishment". LMC§ 5.17.010-120. (1). It exempts from licensing and forced
grandfathering those nonconforming multi-family dwellings where the owner
occupies one of the units. LMC§ 5.17.050 C 2, (2) Nonconforming, non-occupant
landlords are forced to apply for grandfathering and submit to inspections as
conditions to licensing. LMC§ 5.17.050 C 2, D. (3) Licensing and effectively
grandfathering can be denied, suspended or revoked under LMC § 5.17.080 (a)
"A" if "the applicant does not meet the qualifications for a license as provided in
this Title" ... (b) "B" for failure of new applicant to pay fees... (c) "D", "The
rental dwelling does not comply with applicable Health Department regulations
governing the premises, or any city, state or federal law", (d) "E For an existing
license, the licensee has allowed the licensed premises to be occupied, operated or
maintained in a manner contrary to the conditions set forth in the license, this Title
or any other law".
42.

Mayor Watts did not question his reported description of the real

purpose of the Lie. Ordinance:
23
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Brent Wadsworth.. .comment made by Mayor Watts at an Adam's
Neighborhood Council meeting where he talked about taking back the
neighborhoods for single family residents. This (licensing) is a step in that
direction which gives the City the opportunity to go in and see the homes
that have been converted and shut down properties that the City no longer
wants to have as rental. He feels it has nothing to do with safety and much
to do with a policy decision that we will remove rentals from some
neighborhoods in Logan.. .(Watts was present) T 10 p 15.
43.

In the Council meetings that considered the proposed Lie. Ordinance

multiple claims were made and questions raised by the public that it violated
nonconforming multifamily property rights. No request for or offers of legal
opinions concerning those questions were recorded in the minutes. T 10 pp 15-20.
44. Just before voting for the Lie. Ordinance three of the five Council
Members stated they had unanswered questions and concerns about how the
ordinance they were voting for affected nonconforming rights. T 10 p 20.
45. In the Council meeting where the Lie. Ordinance was adopted on
March 2, 2010 the minutes also state:
Councilmember Daines said as part of the grandfathering process there is a
specific citizens committee called Logan City's Board of Adjustment,
which is a citizens committee and they do hear appeals.. .there is a specific
appeals already set up that people can use. T 10 p 18.
46. Utah Code §10-9a-511 (6)-(8) specifies conditions cities shall not
impose on properties under landlord licensing ordinances and requires that they
not be enforced to terminate legal nonconforming rights.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The purpose of this Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is to obtain
relief from the unconstitutional governmental actions of the City in derogation of
the nonconforming rights of the Trust and others similarly situated resulting from
the City's single-family down-zoned "Neighborhood Improvement" changed
policy objective of terminating those rights. A principal change element was from
a policy recognizing those rights as protected by zoning laws to treating them as
zoning violations. This City policy change at least amounted to a deliberate
indifference to nonconforming multi-family property rights. As a result of this
policy change is an independent reason why the City loses its immunity from

damage liability under § 1983. Mone I11/. New York Department of Social Servs.
436 U.S 658, 691 (1978). See Argument H infra.
The unconstitutional means employed by the City to carry out this policy of
rights termination are detailed in Arguments A to H infra and include disregard of
the AE Code's application to the City's entire administrative enforcement, quasijudicial and legislative processes related to nonconforming rights and other code
i

violations. Under the guise that land development procedural rules rather than AE
Code procedural rules applied, the City (1) initiates charges and makes searches
without probable cause and without required warrants; (2) forces targeted and

I

random multi-family owners into staff grandfathering proceedings where; (3) the
staff whimsically, arbitrarily and capriciously finds legal multi-family rights are
i

single-family; (4) then misdirects appeals from the AE Code Hearing Examiner
25
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who has quasi-judicial appeal authority to the Board who has no authority; (5) the
Board has not adopted valid rules of procedure needed for its authority, even if it
had subject matter authority; (6) the Board actually conducts appeals as an ad hoc
legislative policy making body under the pretext it is a quasi-judicial body; (7) in
2010 the Council adopted an unconstitutional landlord licensing ordinance that
multiplies and accelerates its nonconforming rights termination policy and
contravenes its 2004 AE Code, and; (8) in all stages of the administrative
enforcement process, the City disregards the rules of procedure that the City
established for itself in the 2004 AE Code and has failed to implement with
required rules of procedure.
"The failure of an agency to abide by its rules is per se arbitrary and
capricious." State ex. rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.

2d 830 (Wyo. 1991), 2 Am Jur 2dAdministrative Law§499.
There are important and broad civil rights purposes in this case and the
Trust's attorneys are entitled to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
A. Appeal Misdirected From the Hearing Examiner to the Board
The misdirection of the appeal from the AE Code Hearing Examiner to the de
facto Board is stated in the denial letter's bottom line: "If you are not satisfied
with the above decision, Chapter 17.57 of the Land Development Code allows
you.. .to appeal this decision to the Board of Adjustments". T 9 p 4, F 24. The
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2010 version of Chapter 17.57 is T 5 pp 6-8, the 2004 version is T 5 pp 9-11. That
misdirection to the Board was apparently based on the pretext that its jurisdiction
continued under the 1997 Ordinance (T 5 p 3) after the 2004 adoption of the AE
Code. T 6. That authority was preempted by the 2004 AE Code that directed all
appeals including from nonconforming rights determinations to the Hearing
Examiner. AE Code LDC §17.60.030, 220, T 6 pp 1, 4

A. 1. Appeal A uthority is in A E Code Hearing Examiner
The 1997 Ordinance, LMC §2.54.040 B provides "The board of adjustment
shall hear and decide appeals of any order, requirement, decision, or determination
made by an administrative official." T 5 p. 3.
All Board appeal jurisdiction was encompassed in and pre-empted by the
2004 AE Code LDC §17.60.030 scope that states: "The provisions of this Title
may be applied to all violations of the Logan Municipal Code..." T 6 p 1.

A.2. Rules of Construction on AII Interpretation Issues
The rules of statutory-ordinance construction (herein "rules of construction
clause") applied to the 1997 Ordinance and 2004 AE Code and all the ordinances
in this brief requiring interpretation, strongly support the conclusion that by the
adoption of AE Code, all the appellate authority of the Board under the 1997
Ordinance was superceded by the appellate jurisdiction of the Hearing Examiner
under the 2004 Code that also applies to all levels of the enforcement process.
The plain meaning of the "all violations of the Logan Municipal Code"
scope of the AE code jurisdiction clause covers the entire administrative
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enforcement process and appeals and more than encompasses the limited
administrative decision appeal scope of the Board's 1997 Ordinance jurisdiction.
The legislative history of the AE Code confirms that appeals from nonconforming
rights and other occupancy numbers decisions was the principal objective of the
Council in adopting the AE Code. This Court has established ordinance
interpretation rules applied to nonconforming rights:
"Because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's
common-law right to the unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions
therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions
permitting property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the

property owner." Rogers v. West Valley City, 142 P.3rd 554 (Utah App.
2006) ^|15, quote from Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602 at 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
The plain meaning, history and intended purpose of ordinances govern

their construction. R & R Indus. Park, LLC. v. Utah Property and Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 199 P. 3d 917fflj23, 26 (Utah 2008).
A. 3. Construction Rules Applied to AE Code v. Board Jurisdiction
Understanding that multi-family nonconforming rights determinations are
major occupancy issues is a key to applying the legislative history. For example,
the Trust home, if single-family, would be limited to three unrelated adult
occupants. As a nonconforming boarding-rooming house (one, two, three or-four
family) under the 1985 ordinance, as the Trust claims, there are no occupancy
limits. T i t 17.
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The minutes of the November 20, 2002 Council meeting where the AE
Code was adopted confirm that grandfathered rights-occupancy issues coverage
was the Council's primary intended objective in the code's coverage:
Attorney Housley presented background on the ordinance... Work had
begun on the draft document one year ago, patterned after the Provo City's
ordinance. Attorney Housley pointed out the enforcement was not limited
to occupancy issues. It covered all City ordinances and State laws. He
stressed that the proposed Code did not give the City any authority it did
not already have.. .This Code, he said, would not take away a citizen's
grandfathered property rights. He said there were checks and balances
provided to help prevent abuse.
.. .ACTION: Motion by Councilmember Pyfer to change the ordinance
scope to address occupancy violations only. Motion died for lack of a
second, (italics supplied)
Motion by Council member Borg, seconded by Councilmember
Allred to adopt Ord. 02-76, Administrative Enforcement Code. Motion
carried 3-2... T 10 p 25.
Thus the AE Code was included in the Land Development Code (LDC)
rather than the Municipal Code (LMC) where it logically should have been.
On May 4, 2004 City Attorney (then Assistant), Kymber Housley reported
to the Council that land use violations were the primary focus of the code:
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT CODE REVIEW. Assistant City
Attorney Kymber Housley briefly reviewed a code that was put into effect
about nine months ago. The Administrative Enforcement Code
decriminalized code enforcement, requiring a lower burden of proof similar
to Small Claims Court. Attorney Housley reviewed the hearing process and
said that Paul Larsen was the current Hearing Examiner. He encouraged the
council to read the code. He said it was primarily adopted to enforce land
use violations and that area had been the focus, but other types of violations
could be addressed as well... T 10 p 26
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A A Only Nonconforming Rights Named in A E Code
In fact, nonconforming rights determinations and appeals have the
distinction of being the only enforcement types named in and receiving special
treatment in the AE Code. AE Code LDC §17.60.220 F, ("NR Clause") provides:
A hearing examiner shall not make determinations as to the existence of
nonconforming rights. If a responsible person claims a nonconforming right
as a defense, the hearing examiner shall continue the administrative
enforcement hearing and shall refer the matter to the Logan City Board of
Adjustment for a determination as to the existence of a nonconforming
right. The Board of Adjustment's decision shall be binding on hearing
examiner. The responsible person shall bear the costs of the appeal to the
Board of Adjustment. T 6 p 5, F 20.
A.5. Due Process Denied-Failure to Notify of NR Clause Appeal Right
The failure to provide notice to the Trust of its remedy to appeal the code
violation charge (Compliance Request R 14-16) to the Hearing Examiner under
this NR Clause as required by AE Code LDC §17.60.290 7 (T 6. p 7) shows the
City's disregard of the AE Code at all levels and was per se arbitrary. F 18-19
State ex. rel Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P 2d 830
(Wyo. 1991).
A.6. NR Clause Unconstitutional
The due process and equal protection denials created by the NR Clause multiplied
the MLUDMA conflicts it apparently sought to avoid. Utah Code §10-9a-701 (1)
(a)-(b) limits appeal authorities to hearing and deciding appeals from decisions
applying land use ordinances, except for variances. In this and similar cases it
would have violated MLUDMA for the Hearing Examiner to initially determine
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that issue and there would have been no appeal right. On the other hand the Board
can only hear appeals, not initially determine nonconforming rights; there is no
equal treatment for forced and voluntary Director grandfathering cases; no appeal
from the Board's determination and no referral back on non NR Clause appeals to
the Hearing Examiner etc, for AE Code abatement. These problems could have
been solved without the NR Clause in the missing AE Code's required policies
and procedures the Mayor failed to adopt under AE Code LDC §17.60.140, 230 A.
T 6 pp 6, 8, T 9 pp 5-6, F 14-15. The procedures could provide that if a valid
defense to a violation is first claimed on appeal, the Hearing Examiner shall remit
it to the proper administrative official for a determination. Because there is a
severability clause in the AE Code a declaration that the NR Clause is
unconstitutional would leave the rest of the code in force and permit this problem
to be addressed in the missing policies and rules of procedure.

A.7 LDC Ch. 17.57 Pretext to Ignore AE Code at All Levels
Comparison of the violation charge (R 14-16) with the denial letter (T 9 p
4, F 24 ) reveals how the City ignores the AE Code until a violation is finally
established and then disingenuously reverts back to the AE Code for abatement
procedures. The violation charge is silent as to what rules the City is following in
the charging process. Then at R 14-15 it advises of AE Code penalties for false
statements and post confession abatement procedures if there is no contest to the
violation charge. On the other hand the denial letter claims the City is following
Chapter 17.57 of the LDC limited to procedures and appeals on land development
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actions (LDC § 17.57.010, T 5 p 6) in misdirecting appeals from the Hearing
Examiner, to the Board. When the Director or Board make a final determination of
a violation, the enforcement would have to revert back to the AE Code for
abatement pursuant to AE Code §17,60.280-490. T 6 pp 7-12.
The development versus quasi-judicial appeal confusion is highlighted by
the shifting and erroneous inclusion of Board appeals with legislative bodies in
Chapter 17.57. See the 2004 version at T 5 pp 6-8 and the 2010 version T 5 pp 911 with special attention to Table 17-19 under "Bodies to Hear Appeals" in both
versions. LDC§ 17.57.040 A requires that the Director prepare administrative
procedures for the Board of Appeals or Board. See Argument B infra.
Appeals that by any stretch of the imagination should be going to the
Hearing Examiner under the AE Code are directed to the de facto Board of
Adjustment by the City Attorney. In the Council minutes on April 29, 2008 at a
hearing of public comment on the proposal for city owned park strip parking
regulation and enforcement, it is stated:
Jay Monson (Councilmember) asked about the appeals process. Mr.
Nielson said the Board of Adjustment would hear appeals.. .There was a
brief discussion about the appeal process to the Board of Adjustment. Mr.
Nielson explained that the removal of park strips would not be an issue that
could be appealed to the board. Attorney Housley said staff decisions could
be appealed to the Board, i.e. parking permits or on-site parking solutions.
T10pl4.
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A.8. AE Code Shifts Burden of Proof to City & Probable Cause Issues
The letter denying grandfathering stated: "According to the Land
Development Code §17.59.040 the burden of proof that a nonconformity legally
exists rests with the owner not the City." T 9 p 4. This pre AE Code rule was in
accord with the cited ordinance and Utah Code §10-9a-511 (4) (a):

Unless the municipality establishes, by ordinance, a uniform presumption
of legal existence for nonconforming uses, the property owner shall have
the burden of establishing the legal existence of a noncomplying structure
or nonconforming use. (italics supplied)
There is a valid argument not pursued further here that this statute and
ordinance are irrational in view of the fact that the City must have probable cause
of a violation (illegality of establishment) before commencing enforcement,
especially where over half of the residences are nonconforming uses.
The point of this argument is that the AE Code does establish a uniform

presumption of legal existence for nonconforming uses in AE Code LDC
§17.60.230 B, C:
B. The City shall bear the burden of proof to establish the existence Of a
violation of the Logan Municipal Code or applicable state Codes.
C. Such proof shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence...
T6p5.
The Trust submits that the above burden applies because the legality of
establishment of a nonconforming right AS A70/a "raised defense" within the
meaning of the AE Code LDC §17.60.230 G exception:
G. The burden to prove any raised defense shall be upon the party raising
any such defense. T 6 p 5
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In support of this argument the Trust incorporates herein the rules of
construction clause, Argument A.2. supra.
A rational non arbitrary interpretation requires that legality of establishment
("Legality") is not a defense and the burden of proving illegality of establishment
("Illegality") by a preponderance of the evidence is on the City for the following
reasons: (1) A principal reason given for the AE Code was to reduce the criminal
enforcement option burden of proof of Illegality beyond a reasonable doubt to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. T 10 p 26. It is illogical to require
probable cause of Illegality to charge a violation and search without consent or a
warrant and then totally shift the burden to the owner, especially where over half
are nonconforming uses. See Argument E infra: (3) The City's assumption, as in
this case, that they can charge and search over half of the residences in the City
based on multi family use alone without evidence of Illegality has created a virtual
police state: (4) Because the City elected to change its 1950 plan and zoning under
which over half of the residences became nonconforming rights, the City that
made the change should logically have the burden of proving ancient and buried
Illegality facts.
A. 9 No Required A E Code Rules of Procedure-No A uthority
AE Code LDC §17.60.140 provides:
The Mayor shall establish policies and procedures for the holding of
administrative enforcement hearings, the appointment of hearing examiners
and the use of the administrative procedures herein by enforcement
officials. F 14.
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Under this section all City administrative enforcement officials and the
quasi-judicial Hearing Examiners are empowered by these policies and
procedures. There is a later section, AE Code LDC §17.60.230 A, that also
specifically mandates that these policies and procedures shall be followed in the
administrative enforcement hearings:
.. .The procedure and format of the administrative enforcement hearing
shall follow duly adopted policies and procedures. T 6 p 5.
The Mayor and City admitted in response to a GRAMA request that as of
February 2011 the Mayor had not established or adopted the policies and
procedures required by AE Code LDC §17.60.290. T 9 pp 5-6. The Hearing
Examiner is without authority to act and any actions taken by him and the
"enforcement officials" are invalid and outside their authority until this AE Code
requirement is complied with so the public has notice of them. In support of this
argument the citations, references and arguments in the next Argument B infra are
incorporated herein by this reference. Though the lack of required rules in this
case first appeared in the discovery of the absence of required Board rules, the
equally critical questions the court must answer from the civil rights perspective
are these: What are the consequences of the absence of the required policies and
procedures under the AE Code from 2004 to 2011? In all "code violation" cases
before and after this 2006 case, was there lack of authority in the Director, and his
staff from the initiation of the charges through determinations and on to the
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Hearing Examiner? Which other City "enforcement officials" have lacked
authority beyond those related to single-family zone enforcement?
B. Also Board Proceedings Void-No Required Rules
Even if the Board had subject matter appellate jurisdiction over nonconforming
rights determinations, which it does not (Arguments A. 1-9 supra), its failure to
adopt the due process rules of procedure required by the 1997 Ordinance rendered
its de facto actions invalid and beyond its jurisdiction. The de facto proceedings
are a primarily record of admissions by the City. See F 38 hearing summary.
In the pre hearing meeting where the de facto Board adopted sham rules for
future cases on November 14, 2006, City Attorney Housley admitted:
Mr. Housley: .. .The lack of bylaws were pointed out by the (inaudible)
today although the remedy would be. In the unlikely event that a court
would uphold the lack of by-laws (inaudible) all it would do is eliminate an
administrative remedy once we have exhausted the staff level. But since
technically we are required to have them then that technically will be one
less thing I will have to deal with at the court. F 33, R 150(1) p 1
(Housley) As far as the due process goes he refers to the lack thereof.
Admittedly we did not have bylaws passed but that is not where the due
process rights are contained.. .Ordinance and that is contained in Chapter
17 or Title 17 Chapter 57 of our Land Use Code... F 35, R 150(1) p 11.
LMC § 2.54.010-050, the 1997 ordinance that established the Board
provided:
A.. .4. The board of adjustment shall establish its rules and bylaws in
conformance with the requirements of any ordinance or regulation enacted
by the municipal council...
2.The board of adjustment shall adopt bylaws for its procedures and
operations and shall ensure that the bylaws comply with any ordinance
adopted by the council... T 5 p 1-3.
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The City Attorney's misstatements to the lay Board that lack of rules is
merely a "technical" non-substantive defect, that the legislative rules in Title 17
Chapter 57 are due process rules (see Argument A.7. supra), and that they can
continue following Roberts Rules of Order (see Argument C infra) are
disingenuous. The lack of the ordinance required procedural rules is not only a
substantive defect, it is a jurisdictional defect that invalidates the Board's acts.
It is normal procedure for a board to make rules, administer them,
and conduct the first-level review of complaints regarding the agency's
functions.
Caution: Even though the board of adjustment may waive procedural
rules subsequent to their adoption, the board's duty imposed by statute to
enact those rules is not subject to waiver. The failure to follow the statutory
mandate of enacting such procedural rules invalidates the board's
action.. .A board cannot fail to exercise this power and decide the
timeliness of appeals on a case by case basis.
The general principles that all powers of an administrative agency
must be exercised in accordance with the statute or other law conferring
such power and that an agency's jurisdiction or authority to act depends
upon compliance with the statute vesting power in the agency, apply in
relation to procedural provisions laid down in the statutes governing the
agency.. .An attempt to exercise a power without compliance with the
provisions as to the manner and circumstances of its exercise is a nullity...

2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §277.
To be valid the action of the agency must conform to its rules which are in
effect at the time the action is taken, particularly those designed to provide
procedural safeguards for fundamental rights. 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative
Law§276.
Once adopted, the rules of a Board of Adjustment become public records,
and the litigants are charged with knowledge of them. Atlantic Refining Co. V.
Sloan Bd. Of Appeals, 178 NYS2d 73 (1958). The first and most fundamental due
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process right is that litigants have knowledge of the rules under which they must
prepare and present their case.
C. Late Rules-Guise to Obstruct Justice & Continue Ultra Vires Acts
In the de facto Board's regular meeting on the Tuesday, October 10, 2006, after
the Trustee filed the appeal challenging the Board's authority on Friday, October
6, 2006 (F 31), the Board and City Attorney intentionally elected to divert the
Trust into an extrajurisdictional pretext for a quasi-judicial appeal process. They
admitted this in the meeting before appeal hearing on November 14, 2006. The
key to the guise was adoption of rules, invalid on their face for future cases as a
cover for continuing its de facto executive-legislative rights termination policy
business as usual, rather than confessing error. If they had aborted the de facto
appeal process, as they should have done, the Trust would not have been diverted
from its judicial due process appeal to the district court and the de facto Board
would not have obstructed the Trust's judicial appeal. The City Attorney and de
facto Board in their discussion in the meeting before the de facto appeal hearing
admitted they intended, and knew, the possible legal consequences and risks of
proceeding as they did. The extent to which they individually subjectively or
objectively are held to understanding the legal consequences of the scheme is not
relevant at this point. Their admissions also revealed the cover up role of the
invalid rules they adopted.
Board of Adjustments-November 14, 2006...David Daines Appeal
Mr. Croshaw (chair) .. .to begin with we have a couple items of business we
need to follow up on from our October 10th meeting. One would be to
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review and adopt the bylaws as printed in our packet of materials. Kymber
(Housley-City Attorney) do you want us to read these out loud and discuss
them?
Mr. Housley: Not unless you feel a need to? The lack of bylaws
were pointed out by the (inaudible) today although the remedy would be. In
the unlikely event that a court would uphold the lack of bylaws (inaudible)
all it would do is eliminate an administrative remedy once we have
exhausted the staff level. But since technically we are required to have them
then that technically will be one less thing I will have to deal with at the
court.
Mr. Croshaw: Has everyone had a chance to review the by laws and
are there any questions or comments?
Mr. Mortenson (Board member): I don't have any questions. I read
the by-laws and I thought they were straight forward and seem acceptable
based on our past practice. With that I would make a motion to approve
those by-laws. R 150 (1) p 1, F 33.
The de facto legislative pretext for quasi-judicial procedural rules they
adopted to cover their continuing ultra vires proceedings were acquired by the
Trustee by a GRAMA request after the hearings. They are titled "City of Logan
Board of Adjustment Bylaws and Procedures" and state:
... I. ORGANIZATION. C. Duties of the Chair. ..8. Move the
agenda along, hold down redundancy by limiting time allowed for
comments if necessary, set guidelines for public input, and reference
handouts and procedures during meetings.. .F. Secretary. A planning
division secretary shall serve as secretary of the Board. G. Duties Of the

Secretary l...2...3.. A...5...6..T 5 p 4-5.n. Rules of Procedure. The
Board shall use a modified Roberts Rules of Order in conducting board
meetings. T 5 pp 4-5, F 34.
This legislative Robert's Rules procedural guise for this quasi-judicial body
continuing their ultra vires acts is void because it violates the Federal and State
Constitutional due process clauses, the 1997 Ordinance, and; Utah Code §10-9a70land Utah Code §10-9a-705 require the Board "act in a quasi-judicial manner"
and "respect the due process rights of each of the participants." .
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Most of the American Jurisprudence 2n quotes and cases cited in Argument
B. supra regarding lack of Board authority also explain why the legislative rules of
procedure they adopted are void. They are incorporated herein for that purpose.
That law is supplemented by:
... An administrative agency may not, however, make a procedural rule
which the legislature may not make, and rules of the agency may not
operate to deny due process of law. An agency may not assume the powers
of the legislature in making procedural rules or ignore plain limitations on
its authority. It may not enlarge the jurisdiction granted to it by the
legislature, or otherwise by addition or subtraction alter the requirements
stated in the statute. Procedural regulations should not run counter to the
purpose and intent of the statute being administered; they must be
consistent with law, and must be reasonable and not arbitrary. 2 Am Jur 2d

Administrative Law§275?
D. Trust: C/ass-of-One & Civil Rights Retaliation Victim
The initiation of single-family zone violation charge in the Compliance Request
Letter preceded by a warrant-less search denied the Trust as a "class-of-one" equal
protection because the Trust was intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and there was no rational basis for such treatment. F 12, T 3 ^
4-10,15. Village ofWIIIowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), Sioux City Bridge

Co. v Dakota County 260 u. S. 441 (1923).
3

The rules are also void because they attempt to materially change the 1997
Ordinance provision that also violates due process. The ordinance appoints the
Director who's decisions are appealed as the executive secretary and staff of the
Board. T 5 pp 1-2 This violated the due process requirement of a fair trial in front
of a fair tribunal which requires not only the absence of actual bias but also the
possibility of unfairness. Bunnell v. Industrial Comm % 740 P.2d 1221, 1333
(Utah 1987). Over one third of the late rules designate the Director's subordinate
secretary of his Planning Division as the secretary and lists the duties without
removing the Director's staff duties to the Board. T 5 p 5
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Prior to enforcement, the Trustee claimed the City attempted to
extort a gift of street frontage from the Trust for a street improvement. Multifamily neighbors on both sides were similarly situated, did not accuse the City of
attempted gift extortion and have not been charged with single-family zone
violations. The Trustee was also the plaintiffs' attorney in a civil rights action
against the City. F 16. In this case enforcement was based on a complaint by a city
employee that the home was used as a triplex. This violated a City policy that
enforcement would be based only on citizen complaints. F 12.
There are also independent retaliation claims because the attempted gift
extortion violated the City's duty to compensate under the Fifth Amendment and
because of the pending civil rights case against the City where the Trustee was
plaintiffs counsel. Tolman V. Logan City2001 167 P. 3d 489 (Utah App. 2007)
A compelling factor that solidifies this discriminatory enforcement claim is
that the Trust home was a best example of compliance with the City's goals of
landlords providing adequate onsite parking for tenants and having attractive, well
kept and maintained premises. The Trust endorses those objectives of the City
policy and urges the City to use all legal means available to achieve them. This
case is an example of the irrationality of the City policy that uses the illegal means
of terminating legal nonconforming rights and changing the multi family character
of the neighborhoods to single family to achieve those objectives.
The home had been and was being used as a boarding house triplex at the
time of the hearing and had been for over a generation. T 7 pp 1-2, R 148 (11) pp
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2, 5. In a 1975 award, USU stated; "in her spacious home near campus... Mrs.
Daines has been the gracious mother of many foreign and domestic students while
they have lived in her home during their stay at Utah State." R 58. The Board,
regardless of the undisputed facts, also viewed the home as a beautiful single
family home with half acre yard that provided ample parking. Ms. Nyman, a
Board member stated:
I know this is a beautiful home (T 7 p 1 -2) because I have driven by it
several times, I know it would be a great asset to a neighborhood which I
know is, you know that neighborhood struggles that is struggling but I
wondered if this is turned into a multi-family home does the lot in the back
(T 7 p 2), does that make that, so it can be turned into a unit or is the zoning
there such that that wouldn't be. That it would be kept single family.
Because the zoning is now single family? R 150 (2) p 16.
At the beginning of the hearing the Director's spokesman, Mr. Austin, in
his staff report summary to the Board stated:
(showing an air photo) A little bit closer, one of things that becomes very
apparent as you look at this property is it has sufficient lot size both by
today's code and the former code to support the number of units requested
and has ample parking ( T 7 pp 1-2). So this is quite a bit different from
previous ones the board has looked at where the lot is too small or it never
had enough parking. R 150 (1) p 2.
Some of the major ironies in this case are: (1) Why did they target this
particular home, the "beautiful home" that would be a "great asset" to a
"struggling neighborhood" that has far more than enough parking, unless it was
discriminatory enforcement? (2) There is no home in this "struggling
neighborhood" that is more depreciated in value than the Trust home by the often
deplorable over parking and rundown conditions of many homes in the
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"struggling" neighborhood. The Trust's plea to the City is to use every legitimate
means to correct these problems of serious public concern.
E. Search Without a Warrant Violated Due Process & 4th Amendment
This is an aggravated case of an illegal search without probable cause
compounded by its direct violation of AE Code LDC §17.60.150 that provides:
Enforcement officials are hereby authorized, in accordance with applicable
law, to enter upon any property or premises to ascertain whether the
provisions of the Municipal Code.. .are being obeyed.. .If a property owner
or responsible person refuses to allow an enforcement official to enter
property, the enforcement official shall obtain a search warrant before
entering the property. T 6 p 3.
The case history shows an inspection-search by John Lisonbee to "verify
occupancy of property. Suspected 3 units 3/21/06.. .confirming there are three
apartments". R 20. The March 29, 2006 letter-charge stated a "complaint" was
received that there were three occupied apartments and a site inspection was
conducted on March 22nd 2006. T 3 ^j 20-24. The City made no claim to attempt to
obtain consent or obtain a warrant. See also Argument A. 7. supra regarding
disregard of AE Code and Argument D. supra regarding policy against charges
based on employee complaints. "The failure of an agency to abide by its rules is
per se arbitrary and capricious". 2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §499.
These charges and searches without probable cause, subjecting over half of
the residences (77% on this block) to charges and search possibilities simply
because they are nonconforming multi-family uses in single-family down-zones
has ignited a sense of a police state presence. See also Argument A. 8. supra
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regarding probable cause and the burden of proof. See Argument G infra, on the
way the landlord licensing ordinance of 2010 has intensified this atmosphere. .
F. Director's Denial Arbitrary and Capricious
The Director's denial of the Trust's application for grandfathering in view of his
disregarded of overwhelming affidavit and other proof he solicited that proved it
was a legally established nonconforming boarding-rooming house triplex, without
any substantial evidence to the contrary was arbitrary and capricious. In this case
his disregard of the solicited overwhelming evidence was motivated by his and the
City's declared policy of terminating legal nonconforming multi-family rights as
detailed in Argument H infra. The Trustee has been unable to find a reported case
with such direct proof of capriciousness, which is usually based on circumstantial
evidence. The general rule is:
Ordinarily, an agency action is arbitrary or capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress or a state legislature has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of an agency expertise.. .The failure of an
agency to abide by its rules is per se arbitrary and capricious as is the
failure of an administrative body to conform to prior procedure without
adequate explanation for the change.

2 Am Jur 2d Administrative Law §499
The Director made a preliminary ruling that the home could not be
grandfathered and solicited affidavit proof of the Trust's claim for consideration
before his final ruling. T 3 f 28. The Trust submitted 15 affidavits with exhibits
attached as solicited by the Director that established (1) the home was constructed
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in 1952 as a duplex family home with a basement apartment; (2) after Verna's
husband's death in 1959 she took boarders and roomers into the duplex and
received USU recognition for boarding students in 1977; (3) Verna made it a
triplex boarding-rooming home before her death in 1989 by locking two doors; (4)
her Trust continued those uses after her death. F 23, T 1 ^ 34-38. The Director's
denial letter did not explain the basis for his decision, indicated that no affidavits
had been submitted, and that lack of a building permit was the primary basis for
his denial. F 24, T 9 p 4. In the de facto hearing his staff spokesman continued to
defend his the single-family claim, admitted that the lack of a building permit was
a major factor in the denial, admitted the city had no building permit records
before 1962 and that the staff had never read or considered the 15 affidavits
solicited by the Director, and described the lack of substantial evidence to support
the single-family finding. F 25-26.
This degree of arbitrariness and capriciousness of the Director's decision
exceeds the most aggravated that can be found in the cases the Trustee has so far
been able to discover. The Director's letter solicitation of affidavits and
commitment to consider that proof in his decision was his agency rule that he
failed to abide by in this case. As stated in the general rule above this is per se
arbitrary and capricious. See State ex. rel Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.
V. Brown, 805 P 2d 830 (Wyo. 1991). See also Argument H. infra.
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G. Licensing Ordinance Unconstitutional
In the meeting on November 7, 2006 where the citywide policy of terminating
legal nonconforming rights was declared, the adoption of a Provo style landlord
licensing ordinance was considered a means for implementing the policy. F 40, T
10 pp 1-2. That ordinance LMC § 5.17.010-120, under the guise of "Regulatory
Business Licensing of Landlords of Rental Dwellings" ("Lie. Ordinance) adopted
(after the summary judgment pleadings) on March 2, 2010, effective July 1, 2010
(F 41, T 9 pp 1-3), had its true purpose declared by Mayor Watts quoted in a
Council meeting where he was present:
Brent Wadsworth.. .comment made by Mayor Watts at an Adam's
Neighborhood Council meeting where he talked about taking back the
neighborhoods for single-family residents. This (licensing) is a step in that
direction which gives the City the opportunity to go in and see the homes
that have been converted and shut down properties that the City no longer
wants to have as rental. He feels it has nothing to do with safety and much
to do with a policy decision that we will remove rentals from some
neighborhoods in Logan.. .(Watts was present ) F 4 2 T lOp 15.
Under the guise of business licensing, public health and safety, the Lie.
Ordinance facilitates the Mayor's and City's declared purpose of terminating legal
nonconforming multi-family rights in ways that violate due process, equal
protection, freedom from unlawful searches, AE Code LDC §17.60.150 that
requires consent or a warrant, and Utah Code §10-9a-511 (6)-(8). F 13. State V.
Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. 249 P 474 (Utah 1927), (concurring opinion; (Utah
1926): Block V. Schwartz, 76 P 387 (Utah 1902). The Mayor did not deny that he
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said the ordinance was effectively a guise to allow "go in and see" searches
without consent or warrant in order to terminate rentals they did not want.
Under the Lie. Ordinance (1) Owner rental landlords who occupy one of
the nonconforming multi-family units are exempt from licensing and forced
grandfathering; (2) Nonconforming, non-occupant landlords are forced to apply
for grandfathering and submit to inspections as conditions to licensing; and (3)
Licensing and effectively grandfathering can be denied, suspended or revoked for
reasons that are arbitrary and capricious.
Utah Code §10-9a-511 (6)-(8) not only invalidates the broad and sweeping
reasons the ordinances provides for denying, suspending or revoking licenses, it
also recognizes and prohibits the obvious potential the ordinance has to serve
Mayor Watts and the City's termination policy and "be enforced to terminate a
legal nonconforming rental housing use". The legislature also prohibited the city's
unstated but openly declared purpose in its bottom line in Utah Code §10-9a-511.
F42..
Another critical, egregious and unconstitutional effect of the ordinance is
that virtually all the legal nonconforming rights are forced into an AE Code
skipping grandfathering process without the necessity of probable cause operating
under legislative Robert's Rules of Order. See Arguments B, C and E supra. The
following statement is in the minutes of the meeting where the Lie. Ordinance was
adopted.
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Councilmember Daines said as part of the grandfathering process there is a
specific citizens committee called Logan City's Board of Adjustment,
which is a citizens committee and they do hear appeals.. .there is a specific
appeals already set up that people can use. T 10 p 18.
H. City Policies Deliberately Indifferent to Nonconforming Rights
The arguments supra have established the constitutional invalidity of each police
power measure adopted by the City in pursuing its single-family Neighborhood
Improvement policy terminating legal nonconforming rights. This analysis of each
police power measure before examining the Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
consequences of the overall policy is the approach courts have taken in analyzing
police power excesses. 16A Am Jur2d Constitutional Law§378.
The record establishes that those unconstitutional police power measures
were all taken pursuant to a formally declared City "shift in policy" that amounted
to a deliberate indifference to nonconforming multi-family property rights. As a
result of this policy the City loses its immunity from damage liability under §
1983. Monell v. New York Department of Social Servs. 436 U.S 658,691 (1978),
Canton v. Harris 489 U.S. 378,388-390 (1989). J.H. By and Through D.H. v West
Valley City 840 P.2d 115, / ^ ( U t a h 1992), F 6. T 10 p 2.
I. §1983Attorneys Fees Awardable Under§1988
This Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights action has a substantial broad scope
public benefit and those qualifying as the Trusts attorneys pursuant to Title 42
U.S.C. § 1988 should be awarded a judgment against the City for reasonable
attorney's fees as costs related to this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Because the unusually extensive and detailed undisputed record facts in this
case support the Trust's claims as a matter of law, this court should render a
decision and judgment in this appeal that: (1) Finds for the Trust on all thirteen
issues; (2) declares the law to be as argued herein, including but not limited to
declarations that the home is a boarding-rooming complex, and of
unconstitutionality and illegality of ordinances, rules, regulations, acts, practices
and policies; (3) enjoins the City to require it to stop its illegal and
unconstitutional practices; (4) mandates that the City implement executive,
legislative and quasi-judicial practices and procedures that conform to the law and
constitutions; (5) remit the case to the district court for further proceedings
including but not limited to determination of damages and assistance in
implementing the injunctions; (6) award the Trust costs including civil rights
attorney's fees on appeal, and; (7) such other and further relief as the court may
deem just and proper.

RESPECT FULLY SUB MITT ED July 27, 2011.

MMPro Se/ Attorney for Appellant
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